[wordup] The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre ...

[Adam Shand]

this is obviously old but kinda interesting.  i've just included the
abstract, you need to go to the below url for the full deal.

From: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/calahan.htm

Title:

Countering Terrorism: The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic
Massacre and the Development of Independent Covert Action Teams.

Author:

Alexander B. Calahan

Thesis:

The purpose of this study is to examine the methodology of the covert
action teams authorized by Prime Minister Golda Meir to find and
assassinate those individuals responsible for the attack on the Israeli
athletes at the Munich Olympic games in September 1972. Specifically, the
study addresses whether the operational and tactical methods utilized in
this counterterrorist effort were successful relative to the original
operational objectives.

Background:

In 1972, the Israeli Mossad initiated one of the most ambitious covert
counterterrorist campaigns in history. Golda Meir and the Israeli
cabinet's top secret 'Committee-X' devised a campaign in retaliation for
the massacre of eleven Israeli's during the Munich Olympic games. Meir
tasked the committee with devising an appropriate response to the Munich
massacre. The panel concluded that the most effective response was to
authorize the assassination of any Black September terrorists involved in
the Munich incident. The Mossad assumed the responsibility for
implementing the panel's directive. To accomplish the directive, the
Mossad developed several assassination teams, each with specific mission
parameters and methods of operation. The Mossad headquarters element
developed one team utilizing staff operations officers supported by
recruited assets of regional stations and managed through standard Mossad
headquarters' procedures. A second unit recruited staff officers and
highly trained specialists and set them outside the arm and control of the
government. The theory was to support this team financially through covert
mechanisms and let them operate with complete anonymity outside the
government structure. The assassination team deployed through normal
channels failed to complete their mission and publicly exposed the entire
operation. The second team which operated with full decentralized
authority and freedom of movement achieved significant success in
fulfilling their operational objectives and never compromised the
operation.

Recommendations:

Although there are inherent differences between Israeli and U.S. policies,
specifically those addressing the use of assassination as a political
tool, important lessons may be gleaned from this study for policy makers.
Planners of sensitive covert operations must have a firm understanding of
bureaucratic processes. Government bureaucracies inherently limit the
degree of operational success by the nature of their systems.
Bureaucracies cannot move effectively beyond a predetermined operational
tempo, and impose fatal restraints regarding operational tradecraft and
tactics. Successful covert operations demand a flexible capability with
full decentralized authority enabling officers to initiate actions as
circumstances dictate, enhancing the operational success-failure ratio.
When operational teams incorporate decentralized authority in concert with
good tradecraft and tactical techniques, success is virtually assured.
Government agencies are capable of conducting decentralized, sensitive
operations with reasonable operational control and an expectation of
success.