[wordup] Bruce Sterling on Dirty Bombs

[Adam Shand]

Via: Brett Shand <brett at earthlight.co.nz>

>From bruce sterling and the viridia net. the comments ((())) are bruce
sterlings.

Source:Radio Free Europe Crime and Corruption Watch,
Roman Kupchinsky

Subject: RFE/RL Crime and Corruption Watch Vol. 2, No. 24, 
20 June 2002
Date: Friday, June 21, 2002 12:30 PM
From: RFE/RL List Manager <listmanager at list.rferl.org>

"RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
"RFE/RL Crime and Corruption Watch
"Vol. 2, No. 24, 20 June 2002

"Reporting on Organized Crime and Corruption in the former 
USSR, East Europe, and the Middle East

"SPOTLIGHT 

"DIRTY BOMBS AND COBALT PENCILS

By Roman Kupchinsky

"How difficult would it be for a determined group of terrorists, or
criminals intent on nuclear blackmail, to obtain the radioactive
ingredient needed to construct a 'dirty bomb' and make the island of
Manhattan uninhabitable for 40 years? The answer, unfortunately, is 
not so hard at all. 

(((After this narrative hook, it doesn't get any cozier, ladies and
gentlemen.  If your blood pressure's been spiking lately, you might want
to stop right here.)))

   "In the 'Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation
Programs with Russia' issued on 10 January 2001, the blunt facts are all
there:

   "'The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States
today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable
material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile
nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at
home. This threat is a clear and present danger to the international
community as well as to American lives and liberties.

(((Well, obviously the American hyperpower is the number one target for
this kind of antic, but should the Yankees get dirty-bombed, don't
expect that to make an end of the practice.  The American population
boasts more dirty-bomb debris and better-educated terrorists than any
other candidates for mayhem.)))

   "'Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, we have witnessed the
dissolution of an empire having over 40,000 nuclear weapons, over a
thousand metric tons of nuclear materials, vast quantities of chemical
and biological weapons materials, and thousands of missiles. This Cold 
War arsenal is spread across 11 time zones and lacks the Cold War
infrastructure that provided the control and financing necessary to
assure that chains of command remain intact and nuclear weapons and
materials remain securely beyond the reach of terrorists and weapons-
proliferating states.'

    (((Yep, those are some pretty grim statistics...  The USA is spread
across quite a few time zones itself, and should somebody truck-nuke
Washington, the unparalleled US arsenal will be just sort of, well,
sitting there.)))

     "The Department of Energy's (DOE) 'Report Card' identifies the
present danger. It was soon followed by a February 2001 report to the
U.S. Congress by the General Accounting Office (GAO-01-312), 'Nuclear
Nonproliferation == Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; 
Further Enhancements Needed."

     (((Why are our very lives hinging on documents with such dorky,
lifeless prose?)))

    "The GAO report by and large agrees with the Department of Energy on
the complex problems of having a U.S. government agency approaching
Russia, an enemy for decades, and trying to instruct it on how to
protect its own nuclear stockpiles from theft. (((Where's the Russian 
Energy Dept.'s "report card" on the NATO stockpiles?))) 

   "It was clear from the very start that the United States did not have
much faith in the abilities of the Russian Federal Security Service
(FSB) or the country's Interior Ministry (MVD) to guard state nuclear
facilities from theft.  (((Mostly because the FSB and MVD are major 
packs of thieves, but that's another story.))) This correct assumption
was bound to create enemies within the FSB and MVD. The Russians ==
trained for decades to believe that the Department of Energy was merely
a front for the Central Intelligence Agency, which was intent upon 
stealing their secrets == tried to obstruct the project.

   (((I wouldn't be so lame as to claim that the DoE is the same entity
as the CIA, but let me put it this way: they're both obsessed with
fossil fuels.)))

    "They have been highly successful in their obstruction in the past
few years.

    "The GAO study points out that: 'Because the Russian Ministry of
Atomic Energy has restricted the Department's access to some nuclear
weapons laboratories and civilian sites, the Department is not
installing security systems in 104 buildings containing hundreds of
metric tons of material that it has identified as needing improved 
security systems.' It goes on to say that 603 metric tons of highly
enriched uranium and plutonium is at risk of being stolen. 

   ((((Why not buy a personal Geiger counter and see if Al Qaeda has
stored some in your basement?)))

   "The materials at these civilian research centers, naval fuel-storage
areas, and nuclear laboratories can be used in a nuclear weapon without
any reprocessing. They can be carried out by 'one or two people in
portable containers or as components from dismantled weapons.' (((Or,
you can just hide them in a handy ton of Afghani heroin.)))

   "And while the DOE has installed security systems 'not as stringent
as those installed in the United States' (which is strange, given the
likelihood that terrorists or criminals would attempt to buy these
materials not in the U.S. but abroad == most likely in Russia); they are
'designed to reduce the risk of nuclear material theft at Russian
sites.' The GAO report then concludes that its investigation showed
that: 'Russian officials' concerns about divulging national security
information continue to impede DOE's efforts to install systems for 
several hundred metric tons of nuclear materials at sensitive Russian
sites' (p. 27).

    (((Or, you can ignore the Russian nuclear material.  You can be
American, leave your Pakistani wife, step off a plane in Chicago with
some vague evil scheme of using American trash for American dirty-bombs,
and end up as an American-citizen desaparecido.)))

    "Having installed the instruments of security at those sites to
which the Russian government allowed them access, the DOE and the
Russian government need to keep them operational in the long run. But
how are those measures to be assessed? Is the system functioning or not?
In a presumed reference to the Russian capacity for haphazard monitoring
(Chornobyl being the perfect example of a huge 'dirty bomb' released by
faulty monitoring), the GAO report goes on to say that: 'The new
security systems' ability to reduce the risk of theft also depends on 
whether the site personnel operate the systems on a continuing basis.'

     (((It's a shame that this inept sentence destroys that striking
image as Chernobyl as a dirty-bomb avant la lettre.)))

     "This means constant monitoring of alarms, sensors, cameras, and so
on.  ((("Energy too cheap too meter.")))

    "In 1997, the DOE turned to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
to 'develop measures to determine the system's effectiveness.'
Scientists there developed a measurement system, but it was not adopted
'because it was too complex and time-intensive to implement' (GAO
report, p. 16).  (((Maybe our *whole civilization* is "too complex 
and time-intensive to implement.")))

    "In an honest assessment of the situation, (((huh?!  How'd *that*
get in there?)))  the GOA concurs with the DOE and comes to the
conclusion that the Russian side 'lack[s] the financial resources,
adequately trained staff, and the knowledge of procedures to operate and
maintain the systems effectively.... [M]any of the sites cannot afford
the warranties, parts, or technical support necessary to ensure that the
new systems are fully operational' (GAO report, p. 17).

     (((Who on earth *can* afford nuclear power, then?  It's too
dangerous and complicated even for the ultra-tidy Japanese.)))

    "These are the results of official U.S.-Russian efforts to prevent
the theft from Russia of radioactive components that can wreak havoc (by
means of 'dirty' or 'clean' bombs) in whatever city a terrorist group
targets.  (((And if they're like the Khmer Rouge, they'll target *all*
cities just because they're cities.)))

    "Despite these efforts, we must keep in mind that in December 1998,
an employee at Russia's premier nuclear weapons laboratory in Sarov
(formerly Arzamas-16) was arrested for espionage and charged with
attempting to sell documents on nuclear weapons designs to agents of
Iraq and Afghanistan for $3 million.  (((How did an "agent of 
Afghanistan" get that kind of cash?))) 

    "The regional head of the FSB, when reporting the case, confirmed
that it was not the first case of nuclear theft at Sarov and explained
that such thefts were the result of the 'very difficult financial
position' of workers at such defense enterprises.  (((Imagine being so 
broke you need a big bribe from an Afghani.))) The GAO report states
that only four of the 40 buildings in the Sarov facility had completed
or partially completed security systems installed. 

    "But another factor emerges: old, discarded Soviet generators used
to power lighthouses and communications equipment. Some 1,000
radiothermal generators, containing radioactive strontium-90 or
plutonium-238, are now abandoned.  ((("Our Friend Mr Atom."))) This was
first exposed by RFE/RL correspondent Jeremy Bransten on 21 March 2002
('World: Danger Of 'Dirty Bombs' Exacerbated By Old Soviet Generators,'
rferl.org). 

    "In that report, he described how two cylinders containing highly
radioactive strontium-90 were found by three loggers in Georgia. They
turned them in to the state. 'The cylinders were so radioactive, in
fact, they had melted the surrounding snow.' The cylinders were disposed
of by a team of experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). 

     (((Does this report of dead, moldering technology surprise
*anybody* on Viridian List?  Please raise your hand if you are shocked,
shocked.)))

     "These radioactive generators are efficient, compact, and can run
for a number of years. Many of them have been abandoned, and few recall
where they were built. Nonetheless, they remain unguarded, neglected
potential components of a 'dirty bomb.'

"WHAT WOULD IT TAKE TO DESTROY MANHATTAN?
(((Uhm... how about a cattle-call to become the next cast member of "Sex
and the City"?)))

    "Food irradiation is a common process all over the world. It has
produced enormous success in fighting hunger and famine. It can also can
serve a darker purpose: It can be a provider of a simple ingredient for
widespread destruction.  (((Mmm! Tasty!)))

   "In a 1999 publication by the International Consultative Group on
Food Irradiation titled 'Facts About Food Irradiation,'  (((Subsection
(C)(3): "How Food Irradiation Destroys Manhattan")))  the authors
provide the following information on the process:

   "'The radionuclide used almost exclusively for the irradiation of
food by gamma rays is cobalt-60. It is produced by neutron bombardment
in a nuclear reactor of the metal cobalt-59, then doubly encapsulated in
stainless steel 'pencils' to prevent any leakage during its use in 
an irradiator. Cobalt-60 has a half-life of 5.3 years, the gamma rays
produced are highly penetrating and can be used to treat full boxes of
fresh or frozen food. Cesium-137 is the only other gamma-emitting
radionuclide suitable for industrial processing of materials. It can be
obtained by reprocessing spent, or used, nuclear fuel elements and has 
a half-life of 30 years. 

    "'However, there is no supply of commercial quantities of
cesium-137. Cobalt-60 has therefore become the choice for gamma
radiation source; over 80 percent of the cobalt-60 available in the
world market is produced in Canada.  ((("Blame Canada."))) Other
producers are the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China,
India and South Africa.'  (((Models of civil stability!)))

    "Radioactive cobalt used in the process comes in cobalt 'pencils'
which are about one foot long and one inch in diameter. According to a
study by the Federation of American Scientists presented to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on 6 March 2002 by Henry Kelly, if one 
such cobalt pencil were exploded by a conventional explosive (TNT) at
the lower tip of Manhattan, 'No immediate evacuation would be necessary,
but in this case, an area of approximately 1,000 square kilometers, 
extending over three states, would be contaminated.'

    "The residents of 300 typical city blocks would have a one-in-10
risk of getting deadly cancers for 40 years. 'The entire borough of
Manhattan would be so contaminated that anyone living there would have a
one-in-100 chance of dying from cancer caused by the residual radiation.
It would be decades before the city was inhabitable again, 
and demolition might be necessary.'  (((Viridian Involuntary Parks: 
"Manhattan:  Skyscraper National Park.")))

    'Facts About Food Irradiation' adds that: 'From 1955 to date, Canada
has shipped approximately 480 million curies of cobalt-60 without any
radiation hazard to the environment or release of radioactive materials.
Over the same period, approximately 1 million shipments of radioisotopes
for industrial, hospital, and research use were made in North America
without radiation accidents.'

    "This is indeed a fine record, but when the booklet was written in
1999, there was considerably less fear that some of the cobalt being so
frequently shipped might be stolen.

      "The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) assures the public
that: 'CNSC regulations prohibit the disclosure of location, routing and
timing of shipments of nuclear materials, such as spent fuel. The
shipment of radioactive material is also governed by Transport Canada's
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations, which require shippers to
have emergency response plans in place.'  

    Is this enough to prevent the theft of a single pencil of cobalt? 
(((Gee, I dunno... maybe you could steal a pencil of cobalt from a blind
man's cup.)))

     "The Federation of American Scientists  (((A bunch of crazy
leftists, so never mind them))) concludes: 'Radiological attacks
constitute a credible threat. Radioactive materials that could be used
for such attacks are stored in thousands of facilities around the U.S., 
many of which may not be adequately protected against theft by
determined terrorists. Some of this material could be easily dispersed
in urban areas by using conventional explosives or by other methods.' 
((("Au Revoir, Belle Epoque.")))

    "The U.S. DOE Task Force offers a sober assessment of the present
danger: 'Most of the cases involving the successful seizure and recovery
of stolen nuclear weapons-usable material have occurred on the western
border of Russia.' In their estimate, the southern border is much 
less secure == representing the soft underbelly of the former USSR. 
((("Underbelly"?  Come on, it's *all* soft.  *Canada* is soft.)))  

    "The armed conflicts in these regions and the proximity to such
states as Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan makes it a no-man's land for
potential nuclear smugglers. The task force was further advised that
buyers from Iraq, Iran, and other countries have actively sought nuclear
material from Russian sites that could be used in constructing nuclear
weapons."